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Abstract
I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the pro-
duction and use of the locative preposition ‘in’. I distinguish two uses of ‘in’—mate-
rial and descriptive phenomenological—and I explain in what respect movement is 
central to the concept that our use of ‘in’ expresses. I go on to argue that a func-
tionalist semantics of the intelligible use of ‘in’ demands a materialist philosophy 
of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but also why the structure of space is 
not irrelevant either; appeal to the structure of space unsettles the causal-empirical 
assumptions that ground the picture of subjectivity and agency that the biv narrative 
assumes. Finally, I explain why a functionalist semantics demands a Naïve Realist 
metaphysics of perception, consistent with some of Putnam’s last writings on phi-
losophy of perception.
McTaggart says that time is unreal, Moore replies that he has just eaten his 
breakfast.
Both these aspects of philosophy are necessary to it.
Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good.
1  Preamble
There are different ways of formulating Putnam’s notorious antisceptical ‘biv’ argu-
ment, just as there is diverse opinion as to whether it succeeds. I will assume that it 
does in the following form: My word ‘brain’ refers to brains, the biv’s word ‘brain’ 
refers to brains*, and the same goes for vats and vats* and for thoughts as well as 
words. Thus, were I a biv, the thought that I could be such would be unrepresent-
ible—my thoughts and words refer to brains* and vats* not brains and vats. This 
is a formulation of the argument in Kantian guise.1 In this paper, I make a different 
antisceptical move, one that, so far as I can tell, has not yet been tried out.
 * Clare Mac Cumhaill 
 clare.maccumhaill@dur.ac.uk
1 Durham University, Durham, UK
1 For discussion of the self-refuting character of Putnam’s argument, see Button (2016).
 C. Mac Cumhaill 
1 3
The above formulation is fairly generous to the biv since it grants that the biv’s 
words and thoughts refer, that their referents can be ostensively picked out, and their 
thought contents are individuated externally; just as I can point to trees, so the biv 
can point to trees*; just as my thought that oaks spring from acorns gets its content 
through my being causally related to oaks, perhaps at various times, the biv ana-
logue gets its content through the biv being causally related to whatever plays the 
role of ‘oak’ or ‘acorn’ in the envatted world and its respective seasons*.2
The argument I propose is less generous. The standard formulation grants that a 
biv can conceive of itself as a brain* in a vat*. One lesson of the paper is that we 
should append a star too on the locative preposition ‘in’. But the locative is challeng-
ing in a way that oaks and acorns might not seem to be. First, there is no one recur-
rent visual feature that ‘in’ picks out. As I explain, the intelligible use of ‘in’ more 
often relies on a grasp of the nature of the relata it relates, but there is no one kind 
of relation that ‘in’ names and that is repetitively instantiated wherever the use of 
‘in’ intelligibly applies. Second, movement is central to a grasp of the concept that 
the use of ‘in’ expresses. However since the possibility of movement is sensitive to 
the structure of space—and here I mean the unimpeded translation from one place 
to another of things like purses, bikes and birds, as well as our own movement—the 
structure of space in our vicinity is explanatorily relevant to the intelligible use of 
‘in’. Absent that structure and it is not clear what the content of ‘in’* could in fact 
be.
I think there are a number of interesting consequences that follow from this way 
of taking up the biv argument, but here I plumb only one.
It has been assumed that the later Putnam was wrong to think that he needed a 
particular philosophy of perception to stem the sceptical worries that come from 
applying arguments derived from model theory to experience, worries that the biv 
argument was supposed to allay.3 For instance, Tim Button, whose The Limits of 
Realism sets out these arguments beautifully, has it that so long as experience veridi-
cally represents how things are, reference is secured, and so long as reference is 
secured, the nature of our perceptual access to the world is irrelevant to the success 
of the biv argument. The appeal to perception is “a red herring” (2013, p. 92).
2 To be clear, the BIV scenario we are considering is one in which every sentient creature has been eter-
nally envatted.
3 Yet as Moore (1996) notes, while the BIV argument appears in the first few pages of Reason, Truth 
and History, it is only much later in the work that indeterminacy arguments (which flow from model-
theoretic considerations) are introduced: “What the later indeterminacy arguments show is that reference 
is not determined by truth conditions. In other words, given the truth conditions of what I think, or what 
I say, there are endless different reference relations in terms of which they can be specified. What the 
premise of the vat argument is concerned with is what determines truth conditions in the first place. The 
sense in which I cannot have thoughts about trees without coming into suitable causal contact with trees 
is the sense in which my thoughts cannot have certain arboreal truth conditions unless my having those 
thoughts is sensitive to what trees are like” (1994, p. 223).
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I think that focus on the locative ‘in’ shows that this is not so, and to develop this 
idea I draw on a remark made by Putnam more than thirty years later, in a paper 
delivered in 2012.4 Putnam recruits G.E.M. Anscombe, albeit in parenthesis:
There are apperceptions that have no accompanying qualia at all. Suppose I 
raise my right hand. My awareness that I raised it (it didn’t simply “go up”), 
is a genuine awareness, a genuine act of apperception, but there is no quale 
of voluntariness. (I think I remember that Elizabeth Anscombe somewhere 
describes this kind of awareness as “knowledge without observation”, but this 
seems to me to be a misdescription. I would say that I did observe that I raised 
my hand, but this is observation without any particular qualia).
A you-tube video of the original talk shows Putnam raising his arm. But rather than 
consider what Putnam says, I focus more on what he does—move—though I do pick 
up, and make central, his only passing appeal to Anscombe.
Anscombe develops what Ford (2018) calls a materialist philosophy of action, 
something that, as I show and explain, a functionalist-geometric treatment of the 
semantics and use of ‘in’ requires. At the same time, acting on the material world 
typically involves passage or movement through space—simple movement, call it. 
Such simple movement is sensitive to the structure of space in ways I (very gener-
ally) explain. But since this is so, there is a connection—if granted a non-obvious 
one—between the shape of space, and the human concept which a capacity to use 
the locative preposition ‘in’ expresses.
Why should any of this matter for a metaphysics of experience? As I explain, 
the conception of experience that the biv argument relies upon not only forecloses 
theoretical recognition of the materiality of action—the fact that we act on and are 
directly responsive to purses and bikes and not to causal input delivered by impact 
from these things—it concomitantly removes from the province of explanation the 
space in which our activity unfolds, the structure of which our simple movement is 
sensitive to. But it is against this arena that a Naïve Realist metaphysics of experi-
ence can, I think, be brought into theoretical purview. And this is because, as we 
shall see, the way in which space explains is not in respect of its being efficient, but 
in respect of its structure.
This is a hard argument to make, mostly as it tries to hang in the balance two 
‘aspects’ of philosophy that might otherwise be seen as at remove from each other: 
the form of human action (compare the breakfasting Moore) and the structure of 
the space in which, on a grander scale, it unfolds. The argumentative strategy of 
the paper is nonetheless to circle back from one aspect to another. It unfolds as fol-
lows: I note two ways in which the word ‘in’ is relevant to a formulation of the 
sceptical scenario and I show that we ought to prefer a functionalist-geometric treat-
ment of its semantics over an abstractionist or ‘ideal’ geometric analysis. I introduce 
the concept of locational control and I set out how we might understand the notion 
of ‘function’ above, making contact with Putnam’s move to Naïve Realism in the 
4 This paper was recently published in a festschrift for Ned Block - see Putnam (2019).
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mid-Nineties. Finally, I sketch the argument that links our grasp of ‘in’ to a Naïve 
Realist theory of perception, as well as an objection, where here, again, Anscombe 
will come to the rescue.
2  Two Uses of ‘In’
Putnam’s biv is in a vat, tulips are sometimes in vases, pennies in purses. Let us call 
the material use of ‘in’ that use which describes object-object relations of this sort 
and distinguish this use from a descriptive phenomenological use which captures 
the relation that everyday objects appear to bear to the space of our experience—
they appear to be ‘in’ or ‘within’ it, just as bits of furniture occupy a room. Here’s 
Michael Martin exemplifying this latter use:
[T]here is in normal visual experience some sense of not only being aware of 
objects in space, but being aware of a region of space they occupy….one can 
have some sense of the space that objects are located in, even when that space 
is not itself completely illuminated, or is partly obscured. Shining a torch 
across a room illuminates in turn different parts of the room and objects within 
it, but this does not necessarily alter the field of vision; rather there is a sense 
of different parts of the scene being lit up. In the same way, the rearrangement 
of objects so as to reveal what was once obscured seems to be a rearrangement 
of objects within a space experienced rather than an alteration in that space 
(Martin 1992, p. 214).
 I pick up on the notion of ‘rearrangement’ of objects in space a little later.
Now, there is no antecedent reason to suspect that these two distinct uses mark 
out different senses—indeed, on my view, they are part of the structure of the same 
concept. Nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish them for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
plain that a putative biv subject that can conceive of the sceptical scenario in the 
form envisaged by Putnam should have a grasp of both uses. The biv must conceive 
of itself as a brain in a vat (the material use). But the conceit also has it that the biv 
has experience just like us. Accordingly, its experience should be captured by the 
kind of descriptive phenomenology that Martin offers—that is, the biv subject ought 
to have phenomenology that can be captured by the descriptive phenomenological 
use. Such a subject should be aware of objects ‘in’ space, located at places.
The second reason is the following. On an empiricist conception of experience 
whereby it is supposed that what is ‘given’ to one is little more than, in the visual 
case, a colour mosaic (say), the possibility of wringing a conception of the ‘exter-
nal’ world from such bare sensory experience—and, so, for some philosophers the 
possibility of a subject even having the phenomenology Martin describes—requires 
explanation. In his justly canonical (1985) ‘Things Without the Mind’, Gareth Evans 
urges that what is needed is a conception of substance. His master argument is to 
show that only a world that contains space-occupying substance (for him substance 
of the sort that can ground a naïve physics) can allow for the possibility of a sub-
ject’s having a conception of persistent substance in the first place. I don’t explore 
Evans’ transcendental argument here, but there is a sense in which one wing of the 
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argument I offer has a parallel structure, and this is so despite revoking the ‘empiri-
cist problematic’ which asks for an explanation as to how it is possible that, on the 
basis of fragments of sensory input, we can have the conception of an external world 
at all. I argue that simple movement is sensitive to the structure of space and that, as 
such, the structure of space is relevant to a grasp of the concept which the locative 
‘in’ expresses (this, then, is the strand of thought that chimes with Evans’ transcen-
dental strategy). But since the structure of space is relevant in this way, this brings 
into our explanatory purview a form of explanation that is non-causal; after all, it is 
not in virtue of anything that space does that brings it about, in an efficient sense, 
that movement through it is sensitive to its structure. And this in turn explains why 
appeal to the structure of space is challenging for friends of envattedness, as well 
as why the ‘empiricist problematic’ is, in the end, out of place on view I set out to 
develop. But early assimilation of the material and descriptive phenomenological 
uses makes it hard to bring reasons for the rejection of assumption of the empiricist 
problematic into view.5
3  The Material Use and Locational Control
I have so far distinguished two uses of ‘in’. In this section, I want to say something 
about object-object ‘in’ relations in particular. This is since even brief consideration 
of these shows that any kind of hope for an abstractionist account of the acquisition 
of the concept that ‘in’ expresses should be left aside at the outset.
Here are four observations concerning the material use. Where such a use is 
licenced, the contained object is typically smaller than the container—the penny is 
smaller than the purse, the brain is smaller than the vat. Second, where the object is 
immersed in or enclosed by the containing object, it makes sense to say that neither 
are path-connected. If two points are path-connected, they are in the same space—
there is path through space that connects them. If one object is enclosed by another 
object however, the contained object is in the space of the container. Both do not 
share the same space (think of Russian dolls).
Path-connectedness is a topological feature that defines a space. But while topol-
ogy is an abstract art, humdrum reality is different. Take a closed biscuit-tin and 
a child who is trying to prise it open. There is a path through space that connects 
the child’s fingers to her treasure, but human fingers cannot move through tin. If 
the biscuit tin were open, things would be different, but we would still maintain 
that the biscuit is ‘in’ the tin; the locatedness relation that ‘in’ expresses is consist-
ent with partial enclosure. Third, the contained object is often, though not always, 
mobile relative to the container—we say that the bird is in the tree, that teeth are in 
mouths. Teeth can fall out but typically we hope them to be immobile. Finally—and 
5 Linguists exploring locative expressions often emphasise relations between objects—after all, in using 
locative expressions, we are typically describing the relation of something to some other thing. As a 
counterpoint, most philosophers of location start from the assumption of substantivalism (e.g. Gilmore 
2013). See also Parsons (2007).
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importantly—the container typically exercises locational control on the contained.6 
I spell this idea out since it will be useful later.
When a container is moved, its contents typically move with it. The container 
determines where the contained is located. Call this weak locational control. As an 
illustration, consider what looks like a potato in the upturned bowl on the left, below. 
If the bowl is moved far enough in either direction, the potato will move too. Suitably 
understood, then, the potato is ‘in’ the bowl. But matters are not always so straightfor-
ward. While we can happily say that the bulb on the right is in the socket, it might, on 
occasion, be less permissible to say that the potato is in the bowl. This is because as 
things now stand with the bowl, the bowl is not currently exercising strong locational 
control on the contained, call it. In cases of strong locational control, as I will under-
stand it, the shape or structure of the container constrains the possibilities for move-
ment of the contained. Because the potato is resting on the table in Fig. 1 however, 
the shape of the bowl is not exercising strong locational control on the potato.
Simply listing these four features shows that our use of ‘in’ has a degree of com-
plexity—and this is leaving aside all metaphorical uses. But not all dimensions fig-
ure in any given token use, though two or more often do. We might then reasonably 
ask whether entailments flow between certain conditions, or less rigidly, features. 
For instance, the fourth characteristic feature might seem to entail the first, though 
this is often not the case. Flowers can be in a vase, but usually only the stems are 
‘immersed’ in the interior volume of the vase and the water it contains. Nevertheless, 
the vase exerts locational control on the flowers. Likewise, though locational con-
trol might seem to entail the second characteristic feature—relative mobility—some-
times, the control, we might say, is absolute: the contained is held fixed, as the bulb 
in the socket is. In certain cases however, locational control might not seem to apply 
in such a strict sense at all, as, for instance, on a certain reading of ‘the bird is in the 
tree’. Birds fly. Even so, it remains the case that there is a peculiarly avian way for 
birds to be in trees, one that is distinct from ways in which squirrels, say, characteris-
tically occupy or are ‘in’ trees.7 That this is so suggests that there may be a normative 
respect in which we can conceive of locational control. It may be ordered or disor-
dered; the structure of the places in which creatures find themselves, including their 
larger environs, can shape ongoing patterns of activity in ways that are, or are not, 
Fig. 1  From Herskovitz (1985, p. 354)
7 Thanks to a sympathetic reviewer for encouraging me to note this important point, though it is one I 
can’t explore in this paper.
6 For mention of the notion of ‘location control’ see Coventry and Garrod (2004, p. 13).
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characteristic of their species or kind. When a bird is caged, the locational control 
the cage exerts is disordered. Of course, the same is true of the human brain envatted.
Without exploring this or detailing these interdependencies any further, we can I 
think grant that the conditions that invite us to say that something is ‘in’ something 
else can vary enormously, though there is often a pattern in our use which we can 
trace in particular cases and which may deviate more or less from other everyday 
uses. But if this is right, this suggests that we should resist anything like a straight-
forward definitional account of the meaning of in—one that recommends necessary 
and sufficient conditions for its appropriate application say. That is to say, we should 
not maintain:
1. In (X, Y), iff Located (X, Interior(Y)) (cf. birds in trees, cracks in jars).
Nor should we hazard anything like the following:
2. IN: X in Y: X is located internal to Y, with the constraint that X is smaller than 
X—where X is the located object and Y is the reference object (Cooper 1968) (cf. 
flowers in vases).
Or
3. IN: X in Y: X is “enclosed” or “contained” either in a 2D or 3D place Y (Leech 
1969) (cf. open biscuit tins, birds in trees).
But this is not all. What brief reflection on this range of cases shows is that, contra 
an ambitious concept empiricism, there is, in the case of ‘in’, no one recurrent visual 
feature present in all cases which could tempt the suggestion that we abstract from 
those visual features to acquire the concept which the use of ‘in’ expresses. Like-
wise, nor is it the case that the presence of any such recurrent feature warrants the 
application of the locative on some occasion.8 Cracks in jars are very different to 
both birds in trees and bulbs in sockets. Rather that such different objects, includ-
ing even absences, can figure as contents and containers suggests instead that our 
production and intelligible use of ‘in’ is responsive to some other constraint or con-
straints. This is what I explore now by setting out one influential approach to tidying 
up this variation.
Herskovitz (1985) suggests that there in fact is an ‘ideal’ meaning of the loca-
tive expression ‘in’ around which others gravitate. This ideal meaning is character-
ized as ‘the inclusion of a geometric construct in a 1- 2- or 3-dimensional geometric 
construct’ and covers an impressive range of use types: The crack, for instance, is a 
8 Those interested in pursuing a brain-based account of our semantic competence with the locative ‘in’ 
might look to O’Keefe (2003). But there are difficulties with doing so, not least of all the fact that the 
activation of place-cells is anchored to an animal moving its environment, and secondly, the fact that the 
very configuration of grid cells is sensitive to environmental geometry. The relevance of movement will 
become plain as the paper progresses.
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one-dimensional geometric construct in a two-dimensional surface and the bird is 
a spatial entity in the three-dimensional environment of the tree. Importantly, this 
ideal meaning approach prioritizes abstract geometric understanding over any kind 
of understanding of the nature of objects involved, but we might expect this to be 
problematic for two reasons. First, the emphasis on ideal meaning, where this is con-
strued geometrically, often fails to get at why using locatives has a point. When we 
say that something is ‘in’ something else, we typically don’t mean to give a mere 
‘snapshot’ reckoning of where something is at a time. Rather, we aim to supply 
information about how, that thing being so contained, we expect things to unfold 
over time. Yet how things unfold over time depends on the nature of the container 
and the contained. Biscuit-tins are a designated place for biscuits but being told that 
some biscuits are ‘in’ some tin is typically in response to a question, the asking of 
which, presumably, has consequences for their enduring containment. Trees are the 
proper resting places for certain kinds of nesting birds. Being told that a bird is in 
a tree however, might seem to have no consequences for its containment in the tree 
over time, assuming that is that the relevant containment and locational control is 
ordered—so, it is not the case that it’s leg is caught in a branch. Compare the prin-
cess with the glass heart. Suitors had to treat her carefully so that her heart would 
not break.
Second, unlike the topological relation of inclusion noted earlier, a functional 
understanding which takes due account of the natures of the relata involved is 
Fig. 2  From Coventry, Carmichael and Garrod (1994, p. 294)
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not transitive. If an umbrella is someone’s hand, and their hand is in a glove, the 
umbrella is not also in the glove. Where an abstract topological treatment licenses 
certain geometric or spatial inferences, the world does not. As we have seen, fur-
ther, sometimes evidence of weak locational control is sufficient to license the use 
of ‘in’ and in such cases the geometry of the container is hardly relevant at all. For 
instance, consider the pattern of Fig. 2.
The arrows pointing outwards in (g) symbolize movement. If the object in (g) 
moves with the bowl it is ‘in’; the item is judged to be ‘in’ the bowl. Conversely, if 
some item moves independently of the movement of its supposed container, ‘in’ is 
less likely to be applied, as in (f); in (g) the object pointed out by the arrow is more 
likely to be judged to be ‘in’ the bowl than the item in (h).
Function and orientation play a role too. The item at the top of the pile in (l) is 
less likely to be judged ‘in’ the container (a jug) than the item at the same position in 
(k) (a bowl), while the object in (i) is more likely to be judged ‘in’ its container than 
(j). (b), finally, does not appear to be ‘in’ the bowl at all—locational control would 
fail here over time, miracles aside.
Such considerations suggest reason then to favour a functional-geometric 
approach to the production and intelligible application of ‘in’ over an ideal geomet-
ric approach.9 A functional-geometric approach is one that takes due notice of the 
natures of the relata (a jug or a bowl?) as well as the naïve physical intuitions that 
seem to inform locational control—and, as we have seen, where one or more of relata 
is a living thing, there are further considerations to bring to bear, considerations that 
are important in ways that I cannot explore in this paper. Instead, in the next sec-
tion, I develop a rather unexpanded notion of the idea of a ‘function’, though one that 
will suffice for my limited purposes here. In particular, I begin spelling out how we 
can connect observations concerning the semantics and use of ‘in’ to Putnam’s later 
suppositions as developed in his Dewey lectures that a particular philosophy of per-
ception is needed to stem the sceptical worries that his earlier biv argument was sup-
posed to allay. To pre-empt that discussion, here’s a glimpse at the connection:
In order to accommodate, at the perceptual level, what the functional-geometric 
approach seems to require—namely, that a grasp of the natures or kinds of candidate 
containers and their contents is relevant to a consideration of whether the production 
of ‘in’ is appropriate on occasion—it might be thought it need only be insisted that 
experience is rich enough to represent the functional and geometric dimensions that 
are relevant to warranting the application.10 For instance, even if it is insisted that 
the admissible contents of experience are narrow,11 or if it is maintained that the 
phenomenal character of experience is constituted by observational properties like 
colour and shape, so long as experience (however this is to be theoretically under-
stood) can warrant the application of the relevant kind concepts and sortal terms to 
9 See especially Coventry and Garrod (2004), and also Coventry et al (1994). Compare Zwarts (2017), 
which also contains a recent review of the state of the art. For more on the distinction between ‘at’ and 
‘in’, see Wesche (1985).
10 For formative discussion of ‘rich’ content, see Siegel (2010).
11 For discussion, see MacPherson (2011).
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the world (‘jugs’, ‘cages’, ‘pockets’), there is no reason to suppose that offering a 
functionalist-geometric semantic treatment of the production and use of ‘in’ should 
necessitate any particular philosophy of perception at all. But, if so, even with 
respect to ‘in’, perception is—as Button supposes—a red herring. As will become 
clear, I disagree but the route to getting to that conclusion is not direct. It involves 
first an exegetical detour and then an extrapolated appeal to philosophy of action. 
Hopefully the reader will bear the course.
4  Apples and Fields: Two Notions of ‘Use’
So, is it the case that endorsing a functional-geometric conception of the use and 
semantics of ‘in’ necessitates a particular philosophy of perception? To approach 
an answer (something that will carry us into the next section), we need to dis-
tinguish two notions of use that the self-reflective Putnam of the Dewey lectures 
sees at work in his own writings—and here, for expediency, I assume a little bit 
of familiarity of the part of the reader.
The Putnam that introduces the biv argument is an internal realist. For the 
internal realist, unlike her external counterpart, the way our words are responsible 
to reality is not fixed; words like ‘brain’ make sense within a theory, hence the 
internality of the realism involved. Even so, words manage to ‘hook’ onto reality. 
The relevant yoke is causal-referential. It involves naming, which itself involves 
ostension and so the ‘intimate connection’ of perceiving:
We are able to perceive, handle, deal with apples and fields. Our talk of 
apples and fields is intimately connected with our nonverbal transactions 
with apples and fields (Putnam 1981, p. 11).
For the Putnam of the Dewey lectures however a new gloss on the semi-technical 
idiom of ‘transaction’ above is needed, as well as on the ‘intimate connection’ 
of perceiving. In his earlier writings, the notion of ‘transacting’ was conceptu-
ally linked to a Wittgensteinean notion of use, albeit one that was routed through 
machine-state functionalism:
The notion of use that I employed….was a “cognitive scientific” notion; that is, 
use was to be described largely in terms of computer programs in the brain…. 
There was the computer program in the brain, and there was the description of 
the external causes of the language user’s words (1994, pp. 457–458).
But it is this conception of use—“a portmanteau affair”—that the Putnam of the 
Dewey lectures now seeks to repudiate. This is since despite his Wittgensteinean 
appreciation of the importance of use to a theory of understanding and mean-
ing, his earlier metaphysics of mental functioning remained, by his own later 
reckoning, “a “Cartesian-cum-materialist” affair, a picture of mental functioning 
on which it seems “magical” that we can have access to anything outside our 
“inputs”. He explains further:
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To the extent that I was aware of something that could be called “direct real-
ism”, the “direct realism” of which I was aware was only the superficial lin-
guistic reform that does nothing except to make a verbal modification in the 
way the traditional picture is presented. If one holds that traditional picture 
fixed, as I did, then the verbal modification (the modification that consists in 
allowing that we can say we “observe” external things, but of course that must 
be understood as meaning that those things cause us to have certain “qualia”, 
and that they do so “in the appropriate way”) seems, at bottom, just a way of 
hiding a problem, the problem of how even our perceptions can be determi-
nately of particular external things… (ibid., p. 464)
and the problem, if hidden, remains, since, despite linguistic reform (the reform the 
semantic externalist recommends), once a certain conception of experience persists, 
one whereby experience is understood to be veridical if caused “in the appropriate 
way”, there is nothing to stave off the possibility of experience assuming its age-old 
status as a ‘veil’ through which the world is perceived, a world which is thereby only 
an approximation of what’s ‘out there’—different worlds can bring out the same 
experience.
Presciently then, the Dewey-inspired Putnam advances a wholly familiar and 
‘natural’ notion of use, one on which our transactions with the world do not have the 
sterility of ‘input’ after all and ‘reach all the way’ to the apples themselves, to the 
fields we are ‘in’. With these two notions of use distinguished, we are now in a posi-
tion to ask whether the notion of function behind the geometric-functionalist treat-
ment of the semantics of ‘in’ lines up with either of these notions of use.
Since functionalist-geometric approach revokes any kind of abstractionist account 
of the acquisition of the concept of ‘in’, it seems that we should straightforwardly 
resist a conception of use whereby the visual system ‘uses’ certain stimuli pat-
terns as ‘input’ to license the application of ‘in’ on occasion. As we have noted, the 
functional-geometric approach emphasises how things are used in a sense that takes 
note of their purpose and nature, something that, prima facie, seems more in line 
with Putnam’s later notion. Yet even if this is so—namely that functional-geometric 
approach is, in this sense, more ‘natural’ let’s say—why think that a particular phi-
losophy of perception is needed to so as to make intelligible, indeed possible, what 
we are assuming is the most plausible account of the semantics and use of ‘in’? It 
is very hard to see why it should be! Shifting to the kind of philosophy of action 
implicit in Putnam’s (1981) thought experiment helps us get a little further.
5  Putnam’s Gesture
In the youtube video of the 2012 talk mentioned at the outset, we see Putnam raising 
his arm. According to the Putnam of Reason, Truth and History, such gestures occur 
too in the vat:
There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc; but really all the person (you) is 
experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer 
to the nerve endings. The computer is so clever that if the person tries to raise 
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his hand, the feedback from the computer will cause him to ‘see’ and ‘feel’ the 
hand being raised (my emphasis, Putnam 1981, p. 6)
Let us consider the import of the italicised terms. With the use of the word ‘tries’ 
Putnam seems to implicitly endorse what Anton Ford has recently dubbed a voli-
tionist philosophy of action. Such an account gives rise to, as Ford puts, a ‘practical 
correlate of the argument from illusion’. On a volitionist treatment, what is primary 
is a volition or a trying or willing, where what happens after that is ‘up to the world’. 
On this view, there is a gap between willings and their effects. In the good case, the 
world co-operates and we succeed in doing what we were trying to do. In the bad 
case, it does not. Either way, for such a theorist, where the action is in the trying, 
where this—a trying—has been reified into some kind of mental entity, one that, 
like a sense-datum in the perceptual case, is the highest factor that is common to 
both a successful trying and to one that is not. Yet notice here what successful will-
ing in the vat amounts to: a conjunction of phenomenal experiences that we may 
be apt to describe as ‘seeings’ and ‘feelings’ of a hand being raised. I return to this 
specification later.
Now, since the Dewey-inspired Putnam repudiates a model of perception whereby 
the closest the perceiver gets to the world is by way of “input” delivered to his sen-
sory surfaces, we should expect a rejection of the input-output model in the case 
of action too, and Putnam’s emphasis on transaction, which might be thought to 
involve an exchange or transfer, chimes with this ambition. But since we now know 
that what is exchanged or transferred is not now to be understood in terms of input 
and output, how should we understand this notion?
It is a reasonable hermeneutical guess to suppose that what Putman must have 
in mind is a philosophy of action that models Naïve Realism in the domain of per-
ception. That is, it might be thought that for the Naïve Action theorist, as for the 
Naïve Realist about perception, action is essentially world-involving. As we will see 
shortly, however, this bare analogue needs careful elucidation. To see why, we need 
to distinguish the Naïve Action theorist not only from the volitionist but—again bor-
rowing Ford’s taxonomy—from the corporealist.
For a corporealist, what is theoretically privileged against willing is bodily move-
ment tout court. But, on this view, the kinds of actions that we might consider 
world-involving—pretty much any human action you care to mention, all “the acts 
by which human beings sustain human existence” as Ford puts it (walking, eating, 
copulating)—are “second-class expressions of human agency” (p. 710). Rather it is 
primarily by moving its body that an agent is understood to indirectly cause a change 
in extra-corporeal objects, including presumably in other people. Like the volitionist 
then, the corporealist also falls into a kind of practical dualism, though the boundary 
of where the action is extended now outside putative willings to the body.
Now, this, plainly, is not what Putnam has in mind with his talk of reaching ‘all 
the way’ to apples and fields. As a methodological heuristic, we might then look for 
specific analogues that would draw the domains of perception and action closer. For 
instance, we might look for the action analogue of the Naïve Realist claim that the 
contours of conscious character are shaped by the objects, and their intrinsic proper-
ties—their shape for instance. With this in mind, consider Ford:
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In the ordinary course of practical life, bodily movement does not have a con-
tour of its own: it takes the shape, liquid-like, of what we pour it into. By way 
of analogy, consider that if one poured water from pitcher over two differently-
shaped objects arrayed side by side—e.g., a rod and sphere—the water would 
move differently as it fell upon the objects, and over and around them; and 
the difference would be explained by the shape and orientation of the objects. 
Similarly, if one were to grasp each of these objects, there would be differ-
ences in the way one’s hand closed down around them; and the differences 
would be explained, again, by reference to the objects. For, one grips a rod 
differently than a sphere; and how one grips a rod differs according to how 
the rod is oriented with respect to one’s body. The most important disanalogy 
between the movement of the water and the movement of one’s hand is that, 
between the lip of the pitcher and its contact with an object, the water falls in 
the same way no matter what it falls upon. By contrast, the movements one 
makes in reaching out for an object differ according to the grasp that one must 
ultimately take of it. (p. 708)
This passage undermines the idea that, although differences between grasping the 
rod and grasping the sphere can be explained by reference to differences in the 
objects themselves, the movement of the body that grasps them is such that it can 
be cleaved apart from the objects—the rod and sphere—that, on such an assump-
tion, give rise to them. Instead, like the Naïve Realist claim that conscious character 
is shaped by the objects and their intrinsic properties that the perceiver is aware of, 
it might be thought that the contours of bodily movement are constitutively shaped 
by the objects, and their intrinsic properties, that the agent is acting on or transact-
ing with. Yet this parallel remains inadequate—and this connects back to Putnam’s 
reflections on the second notion of use above. It also requires us to take seriously 
the Naïve Realist assumption that experience is not world-dependent but world-
involving; a claim that is distinct though related to the thought that the fundamental 
nature of phenomenal character is such that it is constitutively shaped by the worldly 
objects and their perceptible properties.
The quoted passage (though not Ford’s paper as a whole) abstracts from the 
fact that such ongoing transactions are typically intelligible in the context of wider 
action wholes of which the current transaction is a part. These wider action wholes 
are thereby involved. Think of the intricate finger-work involved in tying laces. 
While the contours of the bodily movement of a particular lace-tying event are con-
stituted by and inherited from the particular shoe-laces being tied by a particular his-
torical individual at a time, tying one’s shoelaces is typically part of a wider action 
whole, a whole in which it is thus involved. For instance, I might be tying my shoe-
laces because I’m going to the shops to buy butter to bake a cake for a visitor I am 
expecting.
So, think now of typical transactions with apples and fields: picking, peeling, 
stewing, hoeing, and harvesting. The contours of the bodily movements involved in 
all these actions are constituted by the properties of the apples picked and peeled and 
the fields hoed and harvested at any particular time. Picking is an elementary action, 
peeling slightly less so, but hoeing and harvesting, the transactions they involve, are 
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quite obviously only intelligible in the context or larger action wholes of greater or 
lesser temporal extent—the keeping at bay of otherwise invidious greenery so that 
seeds can grow, grain milled and, after a time, cakes baked.
Ford calls the picture of human action that appeals to the wider action wholes in 
which worldly constituents participate materialism. On this view, action does not 
stop at willing or at the boundary of the body but goes all the way to the mate-
rial, the apples and fields, the subject is transacting with, and whose transactions 
are intelligible in the context of wider, spatiotemporally extended action wholes in 
which that material participates, in which they are thereby also involved and which 
fall under standard descriptions: ‘hoeing’, ‘harvesting’, ‘baking cakes’.
This synopsis is brief in the extreme. Still I think it is enough to grant the fol-
lowing: A functional-geometric account of the semantics and use of ‘in’ is more 
at home in the conceptual company of such a materialist philosophy of action than 
one that is volitionist or corporealist—after all, the functionalist-geometric account 
emphasises knowledge of what the container and contained are and are for; how 
they are to be used and for what ends. That is why, after Anscombe, the materialist 
draws attention to the manifold different ways in which we, agents, do things, ways 
that are captured by causative verbs, e.g. “scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, knock over, 
keep off, squash, make (e.g. noises, paper boats), hurt” (1981, p. 137). But naturally 
we can also add locative verbs to this list, e.g. stuff, dump, heap, load, pour, fill. 
wipe, rid, drain, clear, remove, empty. Certain of these pick out a change of state of 
the container (it is filled, stuffed heaped loaded with/by); some pick out a change 
of state of the contents of the container (they are heaped, loaded, poured into/onto 
etc.); many containers have their particular modes of being filled: we stuff suitcases, 
load carts, heap bowls.12
What is the significance of all this? Broadly, the idea is that stuffing, loading, 
heaping are actions that agents perform or simply do in the normal course of going 
about in the world—a materialist insight. But learning which things can be permis-
sibly stuffed is to learn something about the kind of thing stuffed and its function—
stuffing a suitcase is fine so long as you can carry it. These considerations suggest 
it is right to pair the functional-geometric account with a materialist philosophy of 
action. The suggestion too is that the notion of ‘use’ in play is at home with the 
conception of use espoused by the later Putnam. But if this is right, ‘reaching all the 
way to the apples and fields’ turns out to be a condition on an adequate grasp of the 
appropriate use of ‘in’. What about a philosophy of perception? Earlier, I promised 
that a detour into philosophy of action could help spell out lessons in this domain 
too. In the next part of the paper, I explain how so—and here the concept of loca-
tional control will be harnessed, albeit beyond the homely scale of Moore’s break-
fast bowl. In conclusion, I tie together both aspects of my argument—appeal to the 
form of human action and to the structure of space.
12 Note that ‘fill’ itself doesn’t specify a manner of motion.
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6  Movement in Space
In his ‘Introduction to Anscombe in Context’, Fredrick Stoutland notes the respect in 
which Anscombe’s outlook is “remarkably similar” (2011, p. 21, fn. 30) to Dewey’s 
naturalism, noting too that it is unlikely that Anscombe ever read Dewey. Perhaps 
then it is not so surprising to find the 2012 Putnam drawn to Anscombe, if only in 
passing. In the rest of the paper, I make Anscombe’s philosophy of action central, 
specifically as a means of trying to establish in what respects only a Naïve Realism 
in perception can stem the sceptical worries that Putnam saw as originally flowing 
from the model theoretic arguments that his biv argument was supposed to stave off.
A materialist philosophy of action is Anscombian.13 I have so far suggested that 
a functionalist-geometric account of the semantics and use of ‘in’ is most at home 
with such a philosophy of action. Yet, as I insisted earlier, there is no reason to think 
that such an account (the functionalist-geometric position) should necessitate a par-
ticular philosophy of perception. We are now, I hope, in a position to see why it 
does. But to do so we need to treat carefully the materialist emphasis that the Ans-
combian philosopher of action recommends.
As the materialist rightly emphasises, the material with which we transact is typi-
cally intentionally-shaped—light switches, for instance, are designed to be switched 
on and off. This helps close the gap between action and the world. But in the case 
of perception, the gap is all too easy to re-insert, especially once an irrepressibly 
seductive conceptual picture of perception and our perceptual functioning remains in 
place. This picture is familiar. On this conception, conscious perceptual experience 
is primarily the upshot of the stimulation of our sensory surfaces by various worldly 
energetic inputs. Such inputs are informative of features and properties of the caus-
ally efficacious material world, aspects of which distinct features of conscious expe-
rience have evolved to represent. Space hardly appears on this conception at all. Or 
if it does, it only appears to the extent that the structure of a particular material land-
scape or environment structures the energetic input that the subject receives at her 
sensory peripheries. Emphasis only on material then, and on the structure of the 
material environment, may perhaps make it all too easy to omit or overlook explana-
tory consideration of the space in which such material is. This is why I suggest back-
tracking to Putnam’s Gesture, just the kind of action beloved of the corporealist.
Now, naturally, larger action wholes like ‘going to the shop to buy butter’ also 
involve what I have called simple movement, such as my moving from the grocer’s 
homeward. I have also already noted that the concept of movement is part of the 
conceptual background that informs grasp of the human concept of ‘in’; it is char-
acteristic of containers that they ‘exert’ locational control, be it strong or weak, on 
their containees. But since simple movement is sensitive to the structure of space, as 
we shall see, emphasis on the kind of movement that the corporealist emphasises—
movement like Putnam’s Gesture—stands to uncover an important explanatory 
13 For clear and lucid exposition of what this amounts to, see Wiseman (2016).
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resource that might go overlooked if we focus only on the forms of human action or 
other forms of life that direct our attention only to material.
To bring out the explanatory significance of the structure of space, return to 
Ford’s reflection on the contours of bodily action quoted earlier. The body is said to 
take the shape, liquid-like, of whatever it acts upon but nothing is said of movement 
in space that we may be apt to describe as empty (say on a windless day). Ford does, 
however, note an important and, for my purposes, explanatorily relevant disanalogy 
between the movement of liquid poured from a height say, and the intentional move-
ment of a body:
The most important disanalogy between the movement of the water and the 
movement of one’s hand is that, between the lip of the pitcher and its contact 
with an object, the water falls in the same way no matter what it falls upon. By 
contrast, the movements one makes in reaching out for an object differ accord-
ing to the grasp that one must ultimately take of it.
That is so. Still, there is a commonality too. In neither case, in moving through an 
otherwise empty region, is the water nor the hand obstructed; there is no resistant 
material present. Yet that is not all. Part of the reason why the water falls the same 
way “no matter what it falls upon” is because the space it moves through is homo-
geneous in a sense I now detail. But the same is true, in this limited respect, of our 
own movement through space even if the particular movements we make in moving 
through space vary. I explain this thought by way of some historical (elementary) 
philosophy of physics.14
In 1876, in the newly established philosophical periodical Mind, Hermann von 
Helmholz argued that solid things are only freely mobile in spaces of constant cur-
vature. By emphasising the possibility of free movement, he hoped to ‘prove’ that 
space is Euclidean, a proof which we now know to be invalid—the space in our 
vicinity is non-Eucildean.15 Still, we can dissociate the insight behind his production 
of the proof, from the proof itself.
Take a space, such as the egg-shaped surface below, and a patch of paper, x, on 
that surface. If the patch were to move across the entire surface it would have to 
change shape; it would have to wrinkle to fit the tapered ends, or tear in cleaving 
Fig. 3  Adapted from Nerlich 
(1994, p. 83)
x
14 I present this thought in a highly intuitive and non-technical way. I’m grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for helping me work out how to frame this appeal to the structure of space.
15 As Friedman (1997) points out, Helmholtz’s empiricism is misplaced in light of what relativity 
teaches—a change in the distribution of matter affects curvature. I leave this complication aside.
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to the widest part. Accordingly, to the extent that it would have to change shape 
in order to move throughout the space, we might say that it cannot move ‘freely’ 
through the space (Fig. 3).
Now, Helmholtz argued that ‘free’ motion, so understood, is a transcendental 
condition on the very intelligibility of the axioms of geometry. Helmholtz’s discred-
ited proof notwithstanding, such axioms are intelligible to us. But this is not all. 
As Graham Nerlich emphasizes (1994, p. 83), “our experience of how things move 
in space suggests they are very freely mobile”, including our bodies.16 Nerlich’s 
thought here is that our bodies don’t have to change shape to move through spaces of 
different curvature so as to ‘fit’ into those spaces—not noticeably at least. We don’t 
experience the ‘rheumatism’ he imagines when he observes:
Since we ourselves are reasonably elastic we could move about in a space of 
variable curvature, but only by means of distorting our body shapes into non-
Euclidean forms. We would have to push to get our bodies into these regions, 
for only forces will distort our shapes. If the curvature were slight, the rheuma-
tism might be might be bearable and easy (p. 39).
Yet that this is so can obscure a simple—and if I am on the right track—explana-
torily relevant fact. The spaces that we move through are homogenous in their cur-
vature. But this in turn explains why we might be theoretically apt to overlook the 
sensitivity of movement to the structure of space, where this applies to not only the 
simple movement of our bodies, but to hoeing, stuffing, pouring, and the whole con-
tinual unfurling of dynamic human reality at large. For now, I focus only on the sig-
nificance of the sensitivity of simple movement to the structure of space.
As Nerlich points out, space explains non-causally. For instance, when I move 
through space,
I don’t pressure the space and it doesn’t pressure me. I can’t push, pull or twist 
it; nor can it do that to me (ibid., p. 40).
That is to say, it is not in virtue of anything that space does, in an efficient sense, that 
explains why I can move through it this way rather than that. Rather, what explains 
the possibility of my moving through space, quite apart from the absence of resistant 
material located there, is the structure or shape of space itself, much as the shape of 
the egg-shaped surface explains why the patch can’t move freely around it. Space 
itself exhibits locational control. And, for Nerlich, since such explanation appeals to 
the topological and geometric properties of space, space explains geometrically, not 
causally.
16 Intriguingly, for Helmholtz, our experience of bodily movement plays a special epistemic role. He 
observes: “as a small elastic flat disc, say of india-rubber, can only be fitted to a slightly curved spheri-
cal surface with relative contraction of its border and distension of its centre, so our bodies, developed in 
Euclid’s flat space, could not pass into curved space without undergoing similar distensions and contrac-
tions of their parts, their coherence being of course maintained only in as far as their elasticity permitted 
their bending without breaking (ibid. p. 15, para 318)” Adding optimistically: “we can infer from the 
known laws of our sensible perceptions the series of sensible impressions which a spherical or pseu-
dospherical world would give us” (my emphasis, ibid.) Cf. the Ancombian position I sketch.
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Now, if this is right—without needing to commit to the fine-grained metaphysics 
that might be supposed to make any such claims true—and if free movement is explan-
atorily relevant to a grasp of what ‘in’ expresses in this way, we can, I think, finally, 
if still somewhat dimly, begin to see why focus on the locative rather than casually-
mediated reference to brains and vats may, in the end, prove challenging for friends of 
envattedness. The way in which space thus explains is not causal, at least in an efficient 
sense. Yet the most that the seductive picture of perception can countenance from a the-
oretical perspective is to appeal to the structure of input at the subject’s periphery. But 
accordingly, a gap can be re-inserted between such input and the nature of the space she 
is in. And when the periphery of the subject is little more than a brain in a vat, the world 
outside that periphery can become as unrecognisible as you like.17
7  Re‑arrangement
The foregoing appeal to the structure of space—and geometric explanation—is I hope 
enough to scatter some seeds of doubt concerning the real possibility of what the biv 
scenario imagines. Yet it might well be objected that an analogue of locational control 
can be introduced in the vat. Why not allow that some computational constraint could 
mirror the constraint that the geometry of physical space places on our movement? 
Such a constraint would likewise be non-causal and structural—and it would not count 
as an “input”. All the biv advocate needs to do is to embrace the required semantics 
and allow non-causal influences to play semantic roles for certain terms.18 I have two 
responses to this suggestion; the first more or less concessionary, the second less so.
On the first, in the biv scenario, unlike our own, we should never have any access 
to the grounds of what non-causally but structurally influences our movement, and 
thereby our thought and talk. That is the cost of the concessionary move. The deeper 
point concerns the very intelligibility of the biv conceit.
In the passage quoted from MGF Martin earlier, he observes how the “the rear-
rangement of objects” in a space can reveal what was once obscured, say the face 
of a friend, hidden from view by tulips on the kitchen table. The rearrangement of 
objects in a space experienced does not involve an alteration in that space.
The argument I am sketching suggests that while space cannot be rearranged, 
its structure is relevant to an explanation of what grounds or makes possible any 
kind of rearrangement in it, assuming here that rearrangement involves movement 
in space. But, as such, the structure of space is, one might think, relevant too to 
an explanation of the possibility of the intelligibility of the concept of re-place-
ment; of one thing taking the place of some other. Yet crudely speaking, this is 
what the biv scenario asks us to envisage, at least once experience is reified as 
17 In particular, it can be radically spatially different to the world we take ourselves to be ‘in’. This is 
the assumption behind David Chalmers’ recent discussion of spatial functionalism. See Chalmers (2006, 
2012 and 2019). See also Thompson (2010) and, for a critique, Epstein forthcoming. The whole current 
of the present paper runs counter to Chalmers’ proposal.
18 I am very grateful to a reviewer for raising this point and for offering this formulation of the objection.
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some thing or event, the causes of which might be supplanted for one the other. 
For much as furniture can be rearranged in a room, it might be assumed that the 
philosopher can rearrange the universe such that things can seem to me now to be 
a certain way (the window beside my desk reveals an Autumn day), even where 
the world in which I am really now stranded is radically different (the acorns* 
and their oaks*). But if this is so, space having the structure it does, where things 
can be moved through it and re-placed, might be looked to as partly explana-
torily of the very intelligibility of the biv fiction itself. It has a natural history. 
We are used to rearranging furniture, replacing things according to our purposes. 
Why not, in imagination, the causes of our experience and indeed our experiences 
themselves, like for like?
Granted a whole lot more work is needed to follow through on this speculation. 
For now, I think I can deliver simply on the question as to why any of this should 
bear on which philosophy of perception we should prefer.
Space cannot ‘get into experience’ on any account of perceptual experience that 
inserts the kind of gap that a materialist philosophy of action closes. I have shown 
that the shape of space is explanatorily relevant to an account of conditions on the 
grasp and intelligible use of ‘in’ but this feature of space—its structure—is not a caus-
ally efficacious property. Further, geometric explanation—the way space explains—
applies to things in space, including agents stuffing suitcases. There is no path that 
connects an agent to the space that she is in. There is hence no path along which 
energetic inputs can travel before being intercepted by some sensory surface. Since 
Naïve Realism does not insert a gap, there is no requirement for space to ‘get into’ 
experience. Experience involves space and its material. And likely, though I have not 
defended this thought here, we get to think of things as being ‘in’ space in much the 
way that we come to treat of tulips in vases, though only the latter can be rearranged.
8  An Objection
This appeal to space so as to do anti-sceptical work is not altogether new. It echoes 
an observation that Adrian Moore makes in an important paper. While Moore insists 
that “not much scepticism is required to think that the topology of space-time is left 
undetermined by what I know (Moore 1996, p. 222). where here he means, presum-
ably, the global topology of space-time, he also writes that the very possibility of 
scepticism, the fact that I can conceive of full range of worlds compatible with my 
experience:
…. is not just due to the fact that the biography of my brain is part of the 
actual world, nor yet to the fact that it is part of that world and of others. It 
is due to the fact that I have thoughts that are suitably linked, through the 
range of capacities and dispositions that I have in virtue of possessing a nor-
mal body, to different parts of space-time. This cuts deeper than the fact that 
I have thoughts that are suitably sensitive to what trees are like. If my think-
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ing lacked this connection with space-time, then it would be out of touch 
with its own most fundamental nature (my emphasis, p. 228)
As I likewise have urged, just as there is no gap between the apples and fields 
with which we transact, there is none between us the spaces we are in and move 
through; our connection with space-time is as intimate as could be. It might be 
objected, however, that I have everywhere appealed to movement in space where 
in fact the biv conceit demands only experience of movement in space. There 
need be no space, nor indeed any movement going on.
For instance, in the passage which introduces Putnam’s volitionism which I 
requoted above. It might be thought that what is needed to secure the appeal to 
movement is only seeings and feelings as of a hand being raised say. But while 
we might be tempted to allow that we cannot cleave apart the contours of bod-
ily movement from the objects acted on, this thought assumes that we can skim 
off seeings and feelings from the things and events that they are putatively of 
or represent (and that can thereafter be coordinated by the murkier vat machina-
tions). This, I suggest, is where the details of Putnam’s parenthetical appeal to 
Anscombe become potent, even if, as I show, aspects of his exegesis themselves 
need replacing.
Anscombe notes that sensations of movement are non-seperable. As I will cast 
things, this is a feature of their form. She explains the notion of non-separability 
with an example:
When I say: “the sensation (e.g. of giving a reflex kick) is not separable” I 
mean that the internal description of the ‘sensation’ – the description of the 
sensation-content – is the very same as the description of the fact known; when 
that is so, I should deny that we can speak of observing that fact by means of 
the alleged sensation (my emphasis, 1981, p. 72)
here she means that the internal description of the sensation gives a description of 
what one non-observationally knows—that one’s foot has moved say. One does not, 
that is, infer that one’s foot has moved on the basis of, or by means of, the sensation 
of giving a reflex kick, for this would be to suppose that the sensation can be sepa-
rately described. What does this mean?
When considering an expression of the form “sensation of X”—say “the feeling 
of a hand being raised”—Anscombe says that we need to ask whether “of X” is a 
description of the sensation content or whether the sensation has some other content 
and X is what produces or goes along with the content (ibid.). She offers an example. 
Take the sensation of “going down in a lift”. “Going down in a lift” is an external 
description of the sensation but the experience can be characterized internally too—
as “a sudden lightness”, “one’s stomach lurching upwards”.
Now, where such experiences can be separately described, this would seem to 
allow for a characterization of the experience as one whereby the external event 
in terms of which the experience is externally separately described is productive 
of the internal sensation with which the external event goes along. But consider 
now the feeling of raising one’s arm. This feeling is not separately describable. It 
is not conceived as produced by an external event—a hand-raising—with which 
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an internally describable sensation ‘goes along’. Hand-raising is not ‘external’ to 
one, volitionism notwithstanding. We are in space.
A further point. Anscombe recognizes purely intentional uses of sensation verbs 
as well as material uses, as she calls them. A purely intentional use is one where a 
sensation verb like ‘see’ or ‘hear’ is intended to be used to characterize only how 
things may seem to one or strike one on some occasion. She lists a number of cases.
1. “I hear a ringing in my ears”.
2. “When you screw up your eyes looking at a light, you see rays shooting out from 
it”.
3. “Do you know how a taste can sometimes be quite indeterminate until you know 
what you are eating?” (1981, p. 12).
 Yet while she recognizes uses such as (1)–(3), the primary intended use of verbs 
of sensation is, she says, material. The descriptions that are the direct object of 
the sensation verb are typically primarily intended as descriptions of things in the 
world that would be available for anyone to see (say) as such.
Now, viewed in an Anscombian light, the biv advocate might be said to go 
awry on two, related counts. Though sensations of movement are non-separately 
describable, we may, on occasion, undergo experiences that are like sensations of 
movement though in the absence of our having moved—say when a train on an 
adjacent platform pulls away. In many such cases, we may be apt to describe the 
sensation felt comparatively, as like the feeling of movement. Such a characteri-
sation is intentional—it characterises how things strike one, how it feels to one. 
But this does not mean that there is a feeling of moving that is, after all, seper-
ably describable. It remains the case that the descriptions that one comparatively 
deploys are those the form of which is non-seperable.
Now, prima facie, the BIV advocate might seem to overlook this fact. Rather, 
given the relative familiarity of movement-like experiences in the absence of 
movement, he might think not only that experiences of movement are fundamen-
tally internal but that they are thereby separably describable; fundamentally inter-
nal since it might seem that they are produced by external events with which they 
go along; and separably describable since it seems that they can be described 
independently of the events that happen when they occur—after all, different 
kinds of occurrences, it might be supposed, can bring them about. For instance, 
the stimulation of the muscle spindles of a stationary arm may bring about the 
feeling enjoyed when raising one’s arm.
Whatever feeling this is, however, we have no reason to call it experience of 
movement though it may feel akin to such experience. Call this alternative experi-
ence of movement*. And certainly if experience of movement is relevant to our 
grasp of the locative—something which I have left open—then the biv advocate 
should advance experience of movement* as a candidate alternative. But if so, 
we should, I think, hang a star too on ‘in’. But whether conceiving of oneself as 
in* a vat* is enough to bring the original conceit into view however, to make it 
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conceptually available, I leave the reader to consider. As I hope is now clear, I am 
sceptical.
9  Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried out a fairly bold tack. Turning away from causally medi-
ated reference, I have sought to explore conditions on a grasp of the concept which 
the intelligible use of ‘in’ expresses, suggesting that focus on the locative does after 
all urge a move towards the natural or Naïve Realism embraced by the later Putnam.
The proposal I have developed appeals to the structure of space but also to our vital 
nature and to the material and intentional form of our lived environment; a world pop-
ulated by purses, vases, jugs, rooms, apples, hoes and fields. These worlds are not at 
removes from each other. The difficulty is to bring them into explanatory synchrony, a 
difficulty I probably haven’t quite overcome. Still, I hope two lessons are plain.
I explained why the appeal to the structure of space should trouble friends of envat-
tedness—space explains movement non-causally—but I also suggested that the mate-
rialist should still make room, as part of larger action-wholes, for movement through 
space of the sort that Putnam’s Gesture exemplifies. In particular, I introduced a name 
for a concept that we have an implicit grasp of but which, if I am right, may well evade 
the biv: locational control. The structure of where we find ourselves and other things 
can constrain and shape possibilities for action and movement, a form of explanation 
that applies as much to Moore’s breakfast bowl as to the deeper metaphysical recesses 
of the spaces it moves through. The anti-sceptical argument needs both movements.19
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